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Summary
The article discusses posthumanist ten-
dencies occurring in the so-called Science 
and Technology Studies (STS), concen-
trating mainly upon B. Latour’s Actor-
Network Theory (ANT). Postconstructivist 
conceptions within STS emphasize the 
crucial role of material situatedness of 
technoscience that is dependent on non
-humans in laboratory practice (allo-
wing to extend and “delegate” cognitive 
capacities to the environment). What is 
more, ANT accepts the radical thesis of 
non-human agency. 
The text also analyses a larger posthu-
manist political trend present in STS and 
in other theories, rejecting the arrogance 
It emerges as an inevitable reaction to-
wards the problem of possible ecological 
destabilization (modern systemic risk or 
axiological/political challenges created 
by the so-called “wet” technologies, such 
as biotechnology, biomedicine, pharma-
cology).
Introduction
The main aim of the article is to discuss 
posthumanist tendencies occurring in 
the so-called Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). STS, initially also re-
Knowledge, which have been develo-
ping since the 1970s stem from the so-
called Strong Program in the Sociology 
of Knowledge of the Edinburgh School. 
Over the course of the last decades of the 
Knowledge was deeply transformed by 
the “turn to technology” and then the 
“turn to things” articulating an important 
role played by non-humans and ontologi-
cal hybrids in the history of humankind 
– particularly in laboratories. The text 
highlights selected STS’s posthumanist 
assumptions and theses that appeared in 
this context. I describe them as a form of 
postconstructivism. Postconstructivists 
within STS emphasize the crucial role 
of material situatedness of technoscien-
ce that is based on non-humans in la-
boratory practice (allowing us to extend 
and “delegate” cognitive capacities to the 
environment). This standpoint accepts 
the radical thesis of non-human agency 
-humans.
 Presently, posthumanism in 
Science and Technology Studies may be 
-
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thropocentrism. Posthumanism of this 
sort seems to be motivated politically. 
Currently it is also gaining prominence in 
as sociology of risk or ecological politics). 
In these contexts humanism is criticised 
as being partial and ethically controver-
sial, but also as inadequate, unsatisfac-
tory and politically dangerous. 
 New forms of political thinking 
expressing strong disappointment in 
the anthropocentric paradigm originate 
-
sequences of practical success of scien-
ce, technology and industry in the last 
decades.1 The disappointment of this 
sort seems to be an inevitable reaction 
towards the severe problem of modern 
ecological risk on the one hand and axio-
logical challenges created by the so-cal-
led “wet” technologies: biotechnology and 
biomedicine on the other. Such a politi-
cal kind of posthumanism will be analy-
Diverse Faces of Posthumanism
-
stinguish other possible forms of contem-
porary posthumanism, indicating their 
there is no place in this article to exten-
sively and profoundly discuss the histo-
rical origins and theoretical detail of the-
se standpoints. But still, differentiating 
the most well-known forms of posthu-
manism will allow us to provide a clear 
present within STS. We must enume-
rate here the following possibilities: 1) 
1  I identify the success of science with reproducibility 
of experimental results and the effectiveness of 
technology.
transhumanism, propagating the idea of 
human enhancement (bioliberalism), 2) 
bio-conservatist critical reaction towards 
extended usage of science and techno-
logy, 3) posthumanism inscribed in ani-
mal and plant studies. We may describe 
(and ultraanthropocentric), the second 
as techno-phobic (and sentimental), and 
the third as balanced.
 Transhumanism is presently ar-
ticulated and defended by such thin-
kers as James Hughes (2004), John 
Harris (2007), Nick Bostrom and Julian 
Savulescu (Bostrom 2005, Bostrom, 
Savulescu 2009).2 These authors optimi-
stically assess the current effects and the 
possible future results of informational, 
biotechnological, pharmacological and 
biomedical revolution. They hope that 
-
cement may radically improve human 
nature (for example: health, lifespan, 
sensitive and cognitive abilities). In the 
text In Defence of Posthuman Dignity 
Bostrom points out that transhuma-
nism should be interpreted as ‘an out-
growth of secular humanism and the 
Enlightenment’ (Bostrom 2005, p. 202). 
Human enhancement techniques (like 
genetic engineering, information tech-
nology, machine-phase nanotechnology, 
virtual reality that is still only anticipa-
ted) are seen as a chance to increase con-
trol over our mental and physical states, 
2  Important previous formulations of transhumanist 
ideas can be found in the article Cyborgs and Space 
(Clynes, Kline 1960) and a book by Robert Pepperell 
titled The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness 
Beyond the Brain (Pepperell 1995). Nathan Clynes 
and Manfred Kline, in the text mentioned above, 
introduced the term of cyborg as a self-regulating 
man-machine hybrid.
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and also as a form of extension of human 
capacities. According to a transhumanist 
perspective, humankind can legitimately 
reform itself in accordance with human 
values, enabling us to project and cre-
ate a more inclusive society and better 
politics as a result. Obviously, this new 
form of humanity created by technology 
can also possess (superhuman) dignity.
 Among the bioconservatists who-
se works are widely known and commen-
Francis Fukuyama (2002) and Michael 
Sandel (2007). From its beginnings, 
bioconservatism has been formulated 
as a dispassionate or even cold reac-
tion to enthusiasm to new potentialities 
and innovations created in laboratories. 
According to bioconservatists we should 
always stay prudent and cautious as 
human enhancement technologies and 
unwanted potentialities opened by la-
boratories may irreversibly reshape our 
nature and therefore undermine human 
dignity. These philosophers stress that 
the secular Enlightenment and “pro-
gress” might create dehumanizing effects 
if its products are used inappropriately. 
As they put it, we should not attempt to 
play God.
 I would like to underline that the 
value of cautiousness does not have to 
be favored solely by conservative thin-
kers. For example, there is an ongoing 
debate about the necessity to fully im-
plement into global systems the so called 
Precautionary Principle. This principle 
enables us to place ethical and political 
considerations at the very core of rese-
arch programs (Andorno 2004). Religious 
metaphors or essentialist arguments 
concentrating upon the unique ontolo-
gical status of human nature or natural 
law are not the only ones used in this 
debate. To take one example, Jürgen 
Habermas, proposes that we open our 
ethical and sociological imagination to 
the possible destabilizing legal and so-
cio-political consequences of laboratory 
interventions (Habermas 2003). 
 Finally, also animal and plant 
studies may be interpreted as posthuma-
nist. They emerged as a branch of cul-
tural studies in the last decades in the 
USA and frequently have their roots in 
animal rights theories. The best-known 
representatives of this approach are 
Donna Haraway (2003, 2008), Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith (2004), and Cary Wolfe 
(2009, 2010).3 
 In his article Human, All Too 
Human: “Animal Studies” and the 
Humanities (2009) Wolfe points to the 
main objective of animal studies: the 
aim is not to extend human sensitivity 
to another marginalized group but to 
transform the current vision of mankind. 
Animal studies do not simply create tra-
ditional stories about animals as tropes, 
metaphors or symbols that belong to hu-
rethink the human/animal distinction. 
In this intellectual project no distance 
can be maintained: the author analyzing 
animals must be reshaped as well, beco-
ming a new subject (Wolfe 2009, p. 569). 
Animal studies are “riveting our attention 
with nonhuman animals” (Wolfe 2009, 
p. 570). Both animals and humans are 
3  What is worth mentioning, all of these authors 
make comments on Jacques Derrida’s philosophical 
victim within the framework of Western ontological 
dualism (Derrida 2002, 2003).
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treated as equal subjects of research as 
mortal, material, sensitive to suffering, 
vulnerable and situated entities.
 Haraway’s achievements are 
especially important in the context of 
the problem of posthumanist tenden-
cies within STS. She is an author who 
of science studies, but also with critical, 
antiracist research programs and multi-
cultural feminism (Haraway 1994, p. 65). 
In her writings she propagated the term 
“cyborg” along with the anti-anthropo-
centric metaphor of a dog. Introducing 
such notions as “naturecultures” or 
“companion species” Haraway tries to si-
tuate her narrations beyond traditional 
philosophical dualism or essentialism. 
For example, in her book When Species 
Meet she tries to focus on the possibili-
ty of sharing suffering by humans and 
other species (especially laboratory ani-
mals and animals that are killed as in-
dustrial organisms). She proposes not 
and she reformulates the question of re-
sponsibility towards them.
Postconstructivist Phase of STS
As I have tried to argue elsewhere, cur-
rent research carried out within Science 
-
stconstructivism (Bińczyk 2010, 2013a). 
The originality of this stage of evolution 
of constructivism lies in the fact that it 
attempts to model laboratory practices 
as: 1) materially located, ensuring prac-
tical effectiveness, 2) empirically under-
determined (which implies rejecting the 
excessive epistemological claims of re-
presentationalism), 3) institutionalized, 
according to standards and criteria that 
are historically contingent (which, in 
turn, implies dismissing the fundamen-
tal assumptions of essentialism), and 4) 
modeled in accordance with certain re-
alistic intuitions (I mean the version of 
realism which I describe as “trivial” or 
“banalized”). The positions of the follo-
wing authors may be considered post-
constructivist in the sense mentioned 
above: Latour’s Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) (1987, 1999), Pickering’s concep-
tion of the so-called “the mangle of prac-
tice” (1992, 1995), Karin Knorr-Cetina’s 
ethnography of laboratory (1981, 1995), 
Ian Hacking’s new experimentalism 
(1992, 2000).4
 Postconstructivism may be cha-
racterized by a critical distance to the 
thesis of the social construction of re-
ality. Simultaneously, the importance of 
non-human factors comes here to the fo-
reground. Instead of concentrating solely 
on the institutional dimension, the abo-
ve-mentioned authors put a clear em-
phasis on the importance of laboratory, 
practical, instrumental and experimental 
context of science, pictured as located in 
a material world. 
 Postconstructivism accepts parti-
cular version of so-called Duhem-Quine 
thesis of underdetermination raising the 
problem of an unproblematic location of 
-
-
phasize is a wider phenomenon of under-
determination of laboratory practice, and 
not only the issue of underdetermination 
(Bińczyk 2013a). 
4  They seem to be in conformity in this respect with 
other views of such STS representatives as Wiebe 
Bijker, Trevor Pinch, Thomas Hughes or John Law.
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 The postconstructivist de-
scription of technoscience uses the con-
cepts of adaptation, interactive stabiliza-
of representation. The use of these cate-
gories allows us not to think of cognition 
-
ady-made theory that represents or does 
not represent reality). Cognition is thus 
regarded as a dynamic, located process 
(of interactive stabilization of the results 
revised. The adaptation may take on 
be evaluated according to different crite-
ria. 
 Based on the results of STS it can 
be claimed that: 1) understanding the 
phenomenon of theorizing requires the 
consideration of the role of bodily and 
physical situatedness of the knowing 
subject and the meaning of its tacit know-
ledge and practical skills, 2) abstract 
thinking would be very limited if it were 
not for the ability to “delegate” cogniti-
ve competences into the environment, 
3) getting sophisticated cognitive results 
happens through the use of instruments, 
prototypes, diagrams, writing, drawings, 
tables, maps and other non-human fac-
tors. 
 According to postconstructivists 
it would be impossible to make compli-
cated calculations without using a she-
et of paper, an abacus or a set of coor-
the DNA structure without a model build 
with colored wires and balls or compu-
ter simulations. Due to the innovations 
that enable to extend or “externalize” 
the mind into the environment, we can 
observe relations, compare results and 
prepare more precise and longer argu-
mentations. Quite importantly, the only 
stable and lasting results are those that 
we have learned to “externalize” into 
the surroundings. Such mechanisms of 
“externalization” are widely employed in 
technoscience, whose history is, in fact, 
the history of innovations aimed to exter-
nalize cognitive functions (Giere, Moffat 
2003, Latour 1986).
 This anti-essentialist approach, 
questioning the epistemological repre-
sentationalism, convincingly locates the 
conditions of practical success of labo-
ratories. In laboratories we create the 
possibility of reducing the complexity of 
the environment, we can duplicate trials 
and errors while reducing their costs. 
STS meticulously reconstructs the rela-
tionship between tinkering and theory, 
between science and technology, both in 
terms of theoretical, pragmatic, institu-
we have seen, it models science in a non
-standard way, by combining instrumen-
talist, constructivist and realistic premi-
ses.
Non-human Agency in the History of 
the Global Risk Society
Latour’s ANT, assessed as one of the 
most ambitious theoretical projects 
within STS (Sismondo 2010, p. 92), de-
scribes the crucial role of non-humans 
in the processes of collective human in-
tegration and coordination. Objects and 
technological infrastructures stabilize 
and consolidate society, contribute to 
social relations as well as embody mo-
ral standards, discrimination or politi-
cal oppression. According to Latour, 
various competencies, dispersed action, 
and even cognition or intentionality are 
13
distributed onto things that are not only 
simple carriers of meanings or passive 
tools of human activities. They act them-
enable or blockade human action (Latour 
1991, 1997). Weapons of mass destruc-
tion create new forms of global politics. 
family and leisure time and transforms 
-
ping. Photographic techniques or the 
construction of a bridge may perpetu-
ate racist social hierarchies (cf. Winner 
1986). 
 Once invented and incorpora-
ted, infrastructures create inevitable 
conditions for other constructions and 
actions. Every successful innovation 
involves an in-depth transformation of 
the collective life in many of its aspects 
This is why non-humans should not be 
interpreted as single items or innocent 
gadgets, but rather as hybrid networks 
with a strong potentiality to destabilize 
surrounding areas. Artifacts and infra-
structures co-created humanity, embo-
died our norms and values and they still 
do. This is why while describing the role 
of objects and technology, we do not have 
to veer off the beaten paths of technologi-
cal determinism or pessimism (depicting 
the processes of alienation of man in a 
technological civilization).
 Nevertheless, in the context of 
enormous complexity of global contem-
porary connections we observe more 
and more surprising side effects, that 
are often visible in very remote areas. 
Societies have to deal with instability of 
heterogeneous networks of relationships 
between various ontological elements. A 
new form of risk – modern systemic risk 
is therefore a distinctive consequence of 
globalization and techno-industrial evo-
lution (chemical, biotechnological, bio-
medical or pharmaceutical) (Beck 1992, 
1995).
 Modern systemic risk causes 
many epistemological, social and political 
problems. It is always axiologically con-
ditioned. At the same time it is real and 
virtual, discursive – socially constructed. 
In a risk society, in which a game about 
-
ty and threats takes place, the status of 
science, empirical evidence and expertise 
undergoes some interesting changes. In 
the time of the loss of public trust and 
numerous non-conclusive controversies 
the role of an expert also changes. We 
observe expert knowledge that is politi-
cally instrumentalized in controversies. 
Doubts and uncertainty are also profes-
sionally produced and commissioned. 
The experts (from whom we cannot re-
sign) are not perceived as independent, 
-
terest. All these processes are pictured 
by many interesting research results of 
Public Understanding of Science (PUS) – a 
Beyond Essentialism: Posthumanism 
in the Epoch of Risk
In the year 2000 a well-known ecologist 
Eugene F. Stoermer and a climatolo-
gist Paul J. Crutzen proposed to call the 
current geological era “anthropocene” 
(Stoermer and Crutzen 2000). The main 
reason for this was the current scope of 
industrial transformation of our planet 
- its water systems, soil and atmosphe-
14
re. Surprisingly, when humanists inten-
scientists proposed the term “anthropo-
cene”. We live in post-natural age, po-
st-environmental era of “anthropocene”, 
because there is no undisturbed Nature.
 In his book Politics of Nature 
ecological politics as the one that can no 
-
tract and essentialist Nature. Instead, 
we should focus our efforts on trying to 
achieve harmonious future. The French 
sociologist replaces an old category of 
“society” (created only by humans and 
social relations) with a more convenient 
notion of “collective”, constituted by hu-
mans and non-humans (other species, 
ecosystems, infrastructures, things), lin-
ked by heterogeneous bonds. Humans 
and non-humans are interconnected 
and interdependent. This constitutes the 
reason why (post)humans must stop be-
ing anthropocentric. We should create 
The Parliament of Things providing the 
possibility for political representation of 
non-humans as well as protection of the 
interest of future generations.
 The current transformation of 
the category of Nature and the proces-
ses of hybridization require a diagnosis. 
-
sis using classical essentialist categories 
(cf. Bińczyk 2013). If Nature itself may 
be legitimately understood as an artifact 
or a human construct in a trivial sense, 
the constructivist framework may prove 
to be more fruitful and ethically desira-
ble than essentialism. Within construc-
efforts as contingent constructions made 
for the sake of the public, and, as such, 
not inevitable in its current form.
 The successes of laboratories te-
stify that so far sacred dualisms (nature-
culture, body-machine, subject-object, 
tool-living organism) are not absolute in 
their character. “Wet” technologies cause 
our traditional essentialist categories to 
become out-of-date, creating a situation 
where the traditional, “ontological hygie-
ne” is no longer attainable. Traditional 
ontological framework seems inapplica-
ble to such hybrid, transgenetic entities, 
as Flavr-Savr tomatoes, Oncomouse TM 
 Essentialism assumes the 
existence of ahistorical, pre-given essen-
ces of things that constitute their iden-
tities. The aim of our cognition in this 
perspective is to disclose these essences 
and the act of disclosure is seen as in-
nocent and non-manipulative. The acts 
of cognition are treated as ethically le-
gitimated, because expanding knowledge 
is always in the interest of humankind. 
Within this framework the ontological 
differences between nature and cultu-
re, facts and values, basic science and 
its technological application are regar-
ded as pre-given and easily recognizable. 
However, in laboratories we not only re-
veal, but also manipulate, intervene and 
create unknown possibilities. This is why 
-
terpreted as an unproblematic common 
good. Rejecting the belief about the po-
litical neutrality of laboratory amounts to 
abandoning essentialism.
  A -
oted in the age of Enlightenment imposed 
severe limitations on our imagination, as 
a result of which we cannot envisage any 
alternatives (and therefore must accept 
the inevitable pursuit of continued gro-
15
wth, new discoveries and innovation). At 
the same time, we believe that environ-
mental damage may be averted in the fu-
 Politically motivated posthuma-
nism in the era of risk states that we must 
think about the existence of adverse con-
sequences of the success of technoscien-
ce in a new, non-standard way. It under-
mines widely accepted beliefs about the 
status of non-human actors, the nature 
of the relation between society and tech-
nology, dynamics of social change, role 
of laboratories and the factors which de-
termine the effectiveness of technology. 
So far, we have tacitly been aware of the 
existence of unwanted consequences of 
our own actions but in the era of modern 
risk we are pressed to respond jointly, ta-
king into account the intertwined fate of 
people, non-humans and our planet as a 
whole.
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